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Book Review 
 
Buller does to Evolutionary Psychology what Kitcher did to 
Sociobiology 
 
A review of Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for 
Human Nature by David J. Buller, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005. 
 
Harmon R. Holcomb III, Department of Philosophy, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY. 40506, 
USA. Email: holcomb@uky.edu. 
 
Just as Kitcher’s Vaulting Ambition (1985) tried to undermine the paradigm of 
sociobiology, so David Buller attempts to undermine the paradigm of evolutionary 
psychology. This book, also written by a philosopher of science, may well be the 
most widely accessible, informed, sophisticated and carefully written systematic 
critique of evolutionary psychology on the market. It is an important book that has the 
potential to be very damaging to public reception of the present science unless 
researchers can defend their work by engaging the content of the critique. If they just 
brush off such critiques, they run the risk to having their research go the way of 
sociobiology and be relegated to the dustbin of failed science until a new group of 
researchers announce a new revolutionary paradigm with a new name. Researchers 
will have to do something about it before the very same popular press that positively 
portrayed the existing science will turn against it and it will become fashionable to 
oppose evolutionary psychology, whereupon suspicion of its possible future success 
will be very high. 
Buller thinks that evolution can contribute to psychology (contrary to 
creationists and some evolutionary scientists such as Gould). Kitcher’s book 
convinced a generation of philosophers and others to abandon sociobiology as mere 
pretensions to science based on dubious theoretical assumptions, shoddy method, and 
unconvincing evidence. Buller, too, offers unrelenting criticism, a host of negative 
arguments that evolutionary psychology’s current paradigm is wrong in almost every 
detail. Eschewing Kitcher-style vitriolic criticism, ridicule, unfairness, and politically 
or morally motivated denunciations of the field, he engages the content of the claims 
in a way that takes them seriously. Like Kitcher, he focuses on the reasoning and 
evidence for its most well-known central theoretical and empirical claims. His stated 
enthusiasm about the broader field of evolutionary psychology comes to this: 
Whereas Kitcher offered no serious alternative hypotheses, Buller hopes to advance 
the field by suggesting alternatives, limitations, corrections, and his own empirical 
study of parenting. He strongly advocates domain-general learning against the usual 
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evolutionary paradigm of domain-specific, functionally specialized psychological 
mechanisms, and reinterprets the data for the main empirical claims in domain-
general terms. 
The book is well organized into extended arguments that offer detailed 
criticism, in successive chapters, of the paradigm: its general theories, typical 
methods, and empirical discoveries about adaptation, modularity, mating, marriage, 
parenthood, and human nature. The distinction between paradigm and field is a key to 
his mode of argument. The paradigm is identified (overly narrowly, I think) with his 
understandings and misunderstandings of the core commitments of the leaders of the 
field--Buss, Cosmides and Tooby, and Daly and Wilson, and Pinker—to the 
exclusion of the work by other evolutionary researchers on those and similar 
evolutionary topics (Holcomb, 2001). Assuming a distinction between evolutionary 
psychology, broadly defined as a field of inquiry, and the current paradigm, narrowly 
defined as a set of guiding commitments and exemplars of the most popularized 
work, he uses a variety of studies in an even broader set of fields of human behavior 
and evolution. For instance, he systematizes criticisms drawn from evolutionary 
anthropologists as Hawkes and Hill, such evolutionary psychologists as Gangestad 
and Thornhill, and such evolutionary biologists as D.S. Wilson to attack the narrow 
paradigm (see the informed bibliographies for each chapter).  When he recounts the 
criticisms, claims, and alternatives of such respected scientists, his book succeeds. 
Buller’s original criticisms, however, sometimes lapse into caricatures of work he 
attacks; his alternative hypotheses are plausible but so speculative that they have less 
going for them than the hypotheses they are supposed to replace, and his alternatives 
do no add up to a coherent rival paradigm for studying the evolutionary status of 
human minds. 
Consider two audiences to whom his book is addressed and their likely 
responses. The primary and largest audience is the educated public, having been 
introduced to the paradigm by these leaders of the field or popularizations of their 
views in only a few books, articles, or speeches. After his barrage, people will be 
shell shocked, their confidence in the paradigm destroyed, and will feel unhappy and 
confused. They will doubt or reject as false everything about the evolved design of 
the mind they thought they knew. Easy come, easy go.  Even people who have read a 
lot in the field will have their faith in it tested. The secondary, smaller audience 
consists of researchers in evolutionary psychology and their followers. Being invested 
in the paradigm, researchers will be motivated to look for ways to disregard his 
arguments or find fault with them, lumping him with the many benighted critics 
whose views fail to provide a guide for advancing the science. In this situation, it 
would be fruitful for us to avoid the temptation of defensive responses, but, instead, 
regard his criticism as an opportunity not only for pointing out his misunderstanding 
of what the current paradigm asserts, but also for correcting its flaws. Even scientists 
who work with a paradigm they know is flawed won’t abandon it until a better 
paradigm comes along, on pain of abandoning their science. Anyone teaching 
evolutionary psychology could easily design a course with, first, the pro-evolutionary 
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psychology view using the usual books by the leaders of the field or popularizations 
of their views, followed by the con-evolutionary psychology view using Buller’s 
book. We can challenge our students and ourselves to decide what claims we agree or 
disagree with, and why. 
Some of his criticisms are based on accurate understandings and others on 
misunderstandings. To advance our inquiry, we need to discuss  whether each of 
Buller’s criticisms falls into the former or the latter category.. The remainder of this 
review will set the stage for such a discussion by  presenting Buller’s case, and in the 
final section, identifying apparent mistakes in the way he makes this case. 
 
Buller’s Case Against Evolutionary Psychology’s Paradigm 
 
So that you know specifically what’s in the book, in this section I shall 
recapitulate Buller’s main claims and arguments without attempting to evaluate them. 
This concise presentation is intended to give a sense of his critique without delving 
into the intricacies and subtleties of his extended argumentation. It highlights the 
logic of his mode of criticism; namely, supplying simpler alternatives to existing 
fundamental claims. I have often suggested that good science does not rest content 
with testing a single hypothesis at a time (because illustrations of preconceived ideas 
are easy to find, as Popper emphasized). We can increase falsifiability by 
constructing alternative rival hypotheses and by arguing that a hypothesis better 
explains the evidence than its rivals, which may require additional evidence to 
discriminate between them (Holcomb, 2001). So, Buller’s mode of criticism should 
be welcomed, not dismissed; how well he executes it, however, will not be addressed 
until the final section. 
Buller attacks the theory of the mind according to the evolutionary 
psychology paradigm as follows. There is no such thing as a universal, adapted, 
massively modular, computational, domain-specialized human mind; none of these 
attributions holds up to scrutiny. We are mistaken to think that human nature was 
designed by natural selection in the Pleistocene epoch and adapted to the past, for two 
main reasons. “The Pleistocene” is too static a concept of our species evolution. 
“Human nature” is too essentialist a concept to be compatible with evolutionary 
theory (species are interbreeding populations, not types defined by their natures or 
essences). Instead, adaptive psychological variation is still present (e.g., genetic 
polymorphisms) and is still evolving (e.g., via frequency dependent selection).  As 
evolutionary biologists and Darwinian anthropologists have stressed, multiple equally 
human types of minds never stopped evolving and adapting, both at the level of 
human phylogeny and that of individual lifetimes (hence, the title of book).Rather 
than postulating numerous adapted specialized psychological mechanisms and a 
universal developmental program for the human mind, it is simpler to posit that the 
flexibility to respond to experiences counts as an adaptation. 
As an alternative to the paradigm’s central claim that the mind consisting of 
hundreds of modular adaptations, Buller (p.196) contends that the only mental 
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adaptations we have are the brain’s domain-general plasticity, initial biases in brain 
development, certain hormones and neurotransmitters involved in regulating 
behavior, and some sexual and emotional responses subserved by subcortical circuits. 
He draws this from an analogy: “The processes (antibody assembly and brain 
plasticity) are biological adaptations, but their products (antibodies and functionally 
specialized brain circuits) are not” (p.142). Another reason the mind is not modular is 
that specialized domain-specific modules cannot process information from any inputs 
without being domain-generalized to gather the totality of information from 
experience in the first place. To work, these modules need a rule specifying “how 
each possible state of the developmental and current environment is to be responded 
to if encountered,” which would be radically domain-general. If so, the concept of 
domain-specific programs governing development is idle, and there is no reason to 
posit anything more than domain-general responses of different genetic makeups to 
different environmental inputs; i.e. just the usual reaction norm of genes, a 
description of development rather than preprogrammed development, plus domain-
general learning. This simpler hypothesis does not envision computational rules or 
programs, just initial biases to apply domain-general learning to certain special 
classes of environmental inputs. 
Now consider the method. The method of reverse engineering, which 
considers human psychology to be  solutions and attempts to infer the problems they 
are designed to solve, cannot work. Ancestral human populations continually created 
new cognitive niches, thereby changing the adaptive problems at hand, and we lack 
the requisite information to know what the adaptive problems are in any generation, 
the specific ways (designs) for solving them, or the grain (breadth or narrowness) of 
the designs. Reverse engineering only delivers speculations, not knowledge, because 
the information we need about how ancestral adaptations were successively modified 
is in principle unavailable. 
Finally, consider the most touted results in the empirical work that constitute 
exemplars of this abstract theoretical and methodological paradigm. Cosmides and 
Tooby claim that we have a cheater detection module used in social exchange, but 
they get the logic of the Wason selection task all wrong in their analysis of the data.  
Basic sentential logic dictates that people should select p and not-q cards as falsifying 
indicative conditional statements of the form “if p, then q”. The experimental tests are 
analyzed as all examples of the same logical form, whereas indicative conditionals 
are assertions of fact  (if p, then q) and deontic conditionals (e.g., If you are under the 
age of twenty-one, then you must not drink alcohol) impose obligations or 
permissions, and their different logical forms are confused in analyzing the test 
results. The experimental results for “content effects” are best explained as artifacts 
of pairing deontic conditionals with arbitrary indicative conditionals. Differential 
performance on those tasks does not mean that subjects are not applying logical 
principles to solve those tasks, but only that they are applying different domain-
general logical principles (basic sentential logic versus deontic logic) in different 
types of tasks. 
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Buller makes this point very concrete in close analysis of the test results, but 
is polite enough not to charge that if we disagree that’s because we should not expect 
to understand it without strong training in logic. He does claim that in designing the 
tests Cosmides and Tooby wrongly assume that the written forms directly indicate the 
mental representations of the subjects. As every logic teacher knows, surface 
grammar in the written forms cannot be counted on to map directly onto logical forms 
in our mental representations. For instance, we all always correctly interpret “all is 
not lost” as “not all is lost”, which has the logical form “for some x, x is not lost” 
rather than grammatically suggested form “for all x, x is not lost”. It is natural for us 
to use background information when interpreting conditionals in order to gain a 
mental representation of the appropriate logical form. The indicative conditionals are 
presented in the Wason tests as arbitrary conditionals (e.g., using letters or numbers), 
whereas the deontic conditionals are typically presented in a natural context (whether 
a familiar or unfamiliar context). For that reason subjects react to the “degraded 
cognitive stimulus” in the indicative cases by often failing to recognize the logical 
form at hand and react to the comparatively clear cognitive stimulus in the deontic 
cases by more often correctly recognizing the logical form at hand. In a variety of 
arguments spanning the many versions of the Wason selection task, Buller argues that 
people are not shown to reason more effectively about social contracts than non-
social contracts. His alternative to the “content-effect” explanation is a “logic-effect” 
explanation, namely, that “subjects grasp the different logical properties of indicative 
and deontic conditionals, and then select the so-called not-Q card with greater 
frequency in response to the later because the appropriateness of that response is 
made more perspicuous by the logical form of deontic conditionals” (p.177). Thus, 
rather than having evidence of a domain-specific cheater detection module, we can 
best explain the total available evidence through different inputs to different types of 
domain-general logical reasoning. Moreover, the evidence for a theory of mind 
modules using autistic children ignores their inability to give attention to 
environmental complexity in general, not just minds. There is more to possessing a 
theory of mind than the ability to pass the false-belief test. There just isn’t strong 
empirical evidence for the hypotheses that we possess a theory-of-mind module or a 
cheater detection module, and hence no strong evidence here that our minds are 
massively modular and work in largely domain-specific manner. 
Buss [1999) claims that there are universal mating preferences, notably, a 
male preference for youthful females and a female preference for high status males. 
But Buss’s hypothesis about male preferences fails to be confirmed in relation to a 
simpler hypothesis about assortative mating: like mates with like (homogamy). 
Buss’s hypothesis fails to explain additional data about how the preferred ages are 
adjusted for sex differences in age at reproductive maturation and grandparenting 
effort. So, Buss’s findings don’t confirm the male preference hypothesis since they 
don’t rule the competing hypothesis of adjusted age homogamy, according to which 
males have an evolved preference for females who are, on average, a few years 
younger than themselves. Moreover, Buss’s hypothesis about female preferences uses 
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a variety of studies, but all the results are confounded by assortative mating by status. 
Instead, female mate preferences will probably turn out to be more strongly tied to 
physical attributes of males, such as physical attractiveness, bodily symmetry, or 
chemical signaling of histocompatibility than Buss acknowledges. And the whole 
outlook behind both of Buss’s hypotheses fails to realize that matings between 
different pairs of couples of similar social status can achieve equal reproductive 
success, even if those pairs have different ranks in the scale of mate value. 
Buss also hypothesizes about marriage, and backs it up with survey data that 
sexual infidelity is more distressing to men whereas emotional infidelity is more 
distressing to women. But because it is commonly believed that women are less likely 
than men to have sex with someone they are emotionally involved with, an alternative 
hypothesis is a female’s sexual infidelity is more distressing to men because it 
contains a double-shot of threats to the relationship, both emotional and sexual. 
However, both Buss’s hypothesis and the double-shot hypothesis are not as simple as 
the relationship-jeopardy hypothesis, according to which both sexes have the same 
capacity to learn to distinguish threatening from nonthreatening extra-pair 
relationships.  Jealousy in sexual relationships is part of more general perceptions of 
threats to interpersonal relationships of all kinds, and sex differences in jealousy are 
due merely to differences in acquired beliefs. No evolved psychological mechanism 
specific to jealousy in sexual relationships need be posited, given this simpler 
hypothesis.  
Daly and Wilson claim that parenthood is regulated by discriminative parental 
solicitude, in which humans have psychological adaptations for discriminatively 
allocating parental care to children they are confident are their genetic offspring. 
They claim much empirical support for the most obvious prediction that the risk to 
the child is as function of the relatedness between parent and child. A stunning 
empirical confirmation is supposed to be the finding that stepparents abuse their 
children at a higher rate than genetic parents.  According to Buller, analyses of the 
data that distinguish various categories of cases (such physical and emotional abuse, 
number of parents per household, whether a given parent is genetic or adoptive, etc.) 
make mincemeat of this finding. It turns out that other implications of this most 
obvious prediction are not the case. First, children who live with unrelated adoptive 
parents are even less likely to be abused than children who live with genetic parents. 
Second, children are at far greater risk of being abused by a single genetic father than 
by a stepfather. Third, children who live with stepfathers are more likely to be abused 
by their genetic mothers than are children who live with both genetic parents. Fourth, 
a child living with a stepfather and a genetic mother is 4.5 times more likely to be 
abused by the stepfather than by the genetic mother. The various ways Daly and 
Wilson have defended or could defend their most obvious prediction against these 
contrary results are considered at length in a wide-ranging discussion of many 
empirical studies, both in close analysis of the numbers and in terms of the alternative 
theory that paternal solicitude is primarily mating effort rather than parenting effort. 
Again, the evidence does not support the confidence that this counts as an empirical 
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confirmation at all. 
 
Kinds of Misunderstandings in Buller’s Critique 
 
I think the leaders of the field, and those researchers who know their work 
well, should beat the press to the punch and defend their work. They do not need my 
help. For instance, Daly and Wilson have already written a long rebuttal to Buller 
(Daly and Wilson, unpublished) in which they strongly defend their theory of parental 
solicitude and empirical discoveries about the “Cinderella effect,” the greater risk of 
abuse to children by stepparents than by genetic parents, and reject his alternative 
hypothesis that abuse by genetic parents is sufficiently underreported to eliminate the 
Cinderella effect at the magnitudes they document in their empirical studies. It will 
take such long, involved arguments to effectively knock down his critiques. Here, let 
me give some examples of how one might use a philosophy of science orientation to 
bolster the terms in which such defenses might be given. These examples by 
themselves do not count as a defense, as it is consistent to read Buller’s book together 
with these examples and conclude both that the reigning paradigm in evolutionary 
psychology contains many mistakes and that Buller’s critique of it also contains many 
mistakes. As Popper emphasized, we learn from our mistakes.  
First, consider the abstract theory. Buller admits there are cultural universals 
but contends that there aren’t psychological universals ; he mistakenly forgets that the 
existing paradigm is about populations, not individuals, that universality is supposed 
to be a population-level affair, and that human nature can change. Buller attacks the 
idea that we are adapted to the Pleistocene, but that was only a first approximation to 
an EEA concept that has been refined for fifteen years; Buller admits that our species 
began with adaptations but contends that they are successively modified; he forgets 
that modifications of adaptations can be described in the usual paradigmatic language 
of ancestral adaptations and the ways they function today. Buller admits domain-
general psychological mechanisms, not domain-specialized ones; he forgets that the 
innate biases he attributes domain-general mechanisms will not lead to the adaptive 
psychological variation he admits without further transformation of inputs into 
outputs aimed at solving specific adaptive problems, which is a domain-specialized 
requirement. Although he admits that the evidence reveals much adaptive variation, 
his own evolutionary model of mind does not provide a theoretical basis for thinking 
that psychological adaptations or adaptive variation exists. Buller rejects modularity 
with arguments levied outside the context of adaptation, but modularity has always 
been a way of describing human adaptations (e.g., there is no one way to maximize 
fitness, and so, different physical or mental “organs” are aimed at solving numerous 
distinct adaptive problems). His alternative to the paradigm he distorts is, by that very 
fact, a view of human nature; continental philosophers talk about the nature of human 
being without being committed to philosophical essentialism and the same holds for 
the paradigm. 
Most importantly, to identify “the paradigm”  using a few researchers in the 
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field of evolutionary psychology and contrast “the paradigm” with “the field” pits 
evolutionary psychologists against each other; it is maddening to find out that Buss is 
an Evolutionary Psychologist (because he holds the paradigm, says Buller) whereas 
Steve Gangestad is not an Evolutionary Psychologist (because he does not hold it, 
says Buller), when in fact Buss’s emphasis on mate selection for resources and 
Gangestad’s emphasis on mate selection for bodily symmetry and good genes are part 
of the same general evolutionary outlook and they view each other’s work as 
complementary rather than oppositional (Holcomb, 2001). Buller’s “evolutionary 
psychology paradigm” is a convenient abstraction and rhetorical ploy that misleads 
the public about the changing, heterogeneous science that is not easily divided into 
“part of the paradigm and part of the field” versus “part of the field but not part of the 
paradigm.” It is arbitrary that Buller hadn’t made, for example, Gangestad’s work 
part of the paradigm at the outset; i.e., that the evolutionary psychological literature 
Buller uses to attack the exemplars of the paradigm wasn’t used to define the 
paradigm in the first place. The actual paradigm that guides inquiry in the field of 
evolutionary psychology must be broad enough to encompass the heterogeneity of the 
field, if we follow Buller’s claim (drawn from Thomas Kuhn) that “a paradigm 
defines a field.” 
Finally, reconsider the empirical discoveries. Although the more I studied 
each chapter, the more difficulties I found with them, I’ll restrict myself to just one 
point about the empirical work of each of the key leaders in the field. 
Cosmides and Tooby claim to have found a cheater detection module. Buller 
says that their claim of massive modularity needs a radical domain-general rule as 
“specify how each possible state of the environment is to be responded to if 
encountered.” But no such rule is needed any more than predator search images in 
nonhuman animals need such a rule. Natural selection requires a correlation between 
search images and predators or prey in the area to design predator-avoidance 
adaptations, and the paradigm is not trying to go beyond such standard biological 
moves in conceiving what evolutionary psychological mechanisms or modules are. 
Modules are adaptations, and the point is that we don’t have a single overarching 
reasoning adaptation for maximizing fitness, but, like other animals, have different 
adaptations for different fitness problems. By building into the “module” concept 
more than it supposed to address, Buller caricatures it and then attacks his own 
caricature. Buller does not show how his “domain-general psychology only” 
approach can solve the frame problem, or the constraints of solvability and 
evolvability that led Cosmides and Tooby to posit modules. Although many of 
Buller’s purely logical points are well-taken, Cosmides and Tooby’s work on cheater-
detection modules has been developed since their early work so as to keep indicative 
and normative conditionals distinct and otherwise not fall prey to logical truisms 
(e.g., Fiddick, 2004).  
Buss claims that men desire youth in females. He bases this on his now-
famous worldwide study and on numerous subsequent studies. Buller’s criticism of 
the worldwide study analyses the data in a way that obviously doesn’t make sense. He 
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aggregates the data on sex differences across all 27 cultures, whereas the standard 
paradigm is that sex-differences exist in an expected direction in most cultures, and 
so the data are to be analyzed for sex-differences within each culture. To lump the 
data across cultures gets rid of the theoretically expected effect, but that is no 
criticism, because it does not test the evolutionary paradigm at hand. Moreover, the 
finding that men have mates slightly younger, on average, than themselves, fits 
Buss’s point in his book, Evolutionary Psychology (1999, p.105, 130) that women’s 
mate preferences address the problem of selecting a mate who is compatible with the 
solution of preferring mates of similar values, ages, and personalities. Compatibility 
and a desire for youthful females are each preferences that get weighted differently by 
different people, and actual behavior should reflect compromises in the total array of 
preferences of each mate. Both men and women face the “compatible mate” problem 
for long-term mating, so that Buller’s alleged alternative of homogamy is not all that 
different from the implications of what Buss’s theory as a whole already told us. This 
is an instance of Buller making the existing paradigm narrower than it is.  
Daly and Wilson claim to find evidence supporting their theory of parental 
solicitude. Buller’s criticism that male step-parenting reflects an evolution of mating 
effort rather than parental effort on the part of males (not parental solicitude) is also 
not much of an alternative. Daly and Wilson have said that in step-parental 
households the stepchildren are at risk in cases in which the male is committed to the 
spouse and her former mate’s children come along as baggage. In that situation, the 
male stepparent is engaging in mating effort in order to retain the spouse and is not 
independently engaging a desire on his part for stepchildren, as a result of which they 
are at risk for abuse by him. Further, Buller derives numerous predictions from their 
theory that I wouldn’t have derived as predictions; he then finds that the evidence 
fails to conform to his (questionable) predictions, and concludes that Daly and 
Wilson’s theory therefore lacks solid evidence. But if he derived the wrong 
predictions, his counter-results show nothing. For instance, Daly and Wilson do not 
derive a prediction, concerning households in which both parents adopts a genetically 
unrelated child that such children are at even greater risk of abuse than in one 
stepparent families. In such a case, both parents are adopting an unrelated child 
because they both want that child, so the rationale behind the parental solicitude 
theory’s implications for child abuse simply does not apply. 
Finally, consider the method of reverse engineering. This is good place to 
make a rejoinder to Buller’s attack on the “reverse engineering” method that Buss and 
Pinker use. Buss and Pinker know that the physical, psychological, and social 
conditions found in hunter-gatherer and other ancestral populations are complex. 
They can add the idea of new cognitive niches to their theory and method without 
having to abandon reverse engineering. It is precisely because we don’t have lots of 
information we wish we had about our ancestral populations and the selection 
pressures they faced that Buss’s method was to create the simplest possible picture of 
those selection pressures, e.g., because the more he assumed about them the more 
likely those assumptions would be mistaken (personal communication from Buss). 
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Scientists devise methods for use given the available information, not perfect 
information. It is normal scientific procedure to use methods like reverse engineering, 
and adding additional nuance to the methodology if more types of information 
become available. If Buller really thinks that we cannot have plausible assumptions 
about the adaptive problems our ancestors faced, then his own alternative hypotheses 
to the empirical hypotheses he rejects would have to be rejected according to his own 
principles. On the contrary, we make assumptions about our evolutionary history and 
selective forces, construct hypotheses, derive predictions, and test them. 
In providing alternative hypotheses to the empirical claims, Buller is assuming 
that he does have a definite idea of the relevant adaptive problem. So, his indictment 
of reverse engineering is inconsistent with his effort to construct simpler hypotheses 
with which to criticize the existing empirical hypotheses. Moreover, it matters 
whether his conclusion of an existing empirical hypothesis is only that it might be 
mistaken or that it is in fact false. To show it might be mistaken, one only needs to 
raise doubts, and, yes, because science is provisional, doubts can always be raised 
about scientific hypotheses. To show that the existing key empirical hypotheses are in 
fact false, one has to argue from the truth of some relevant alternative. But Buller’s 
alternative hypotheses, although simpler, have not been shown by him to be true as 
based on solid empirical evidence. They are just alternative ways to account for the 
known data. Buller misleads us by arguing that what appeared to be “solid 
confirmation” of well-known empirical work by Cosmides and Tooby, Buss, and 
Daly and Wilson dissolves into “no solid confirmation” just because he can think of 
an alternative hypothesis to account for the same data. To be fair, we should say that 
the same data can be explained by two or more particular hypotheses, a situation 
pervasive in science. 
In these and other ways, Buller’s arguments do not support the main 
conclusion that the exemplars of the existing paradigm “are mistaken in almost every 
detail.”  Even so, by critically discussing this book in relation to the existing 
evolutionary psychological literature, one can learn “how to think like an 
evolutionist.” 
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